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INTRODUCTION
This article examines the unique risks associated with Islamic financial insti-
tutions and the secular state’s reticence to directly regulate their religious
dimension. It argues that the state’s method of regulating the Islamic financial
industry ignores special reputational risks associated with the religious and
cultural distinctiveness of Islamic banks.
The Financial Services Authority (FSA), the body responsible for the author-
isation and regulation of all financial services in the United Kingdom, applies
conventional regulatory criteria and product definitions in authorising Islamic
financial institutions. Yet these banks differentiate themselves from their con-
ventional peers in that they house so-called Sharia supervisory boards. Sharia
boards’ principal remit is to audit products and services for their compatibility
with Islamic principles, which developed over the course of centuries of
Islamic jurisprudence. Products that comply with such principles earn the
‘Islamic’ label, which is crucial to their uptake by Muslim investors.
Therefore, Sharia boards’ direct responsibility for the religious interests of
Muslim consumers creates a unique reputational risk in such institutions
insofar as banks found to have contravened the Sharia may trigger a lack of
confidence in them.
The article proceeds in highlighting these issues by first addressing the
current state of Islamic finance in the UK and the government’s objectives in
creating an Islamic financial centre. Second, the government’s modus operandi
in facilitating and regulating Islamic finance is scrutinised with respect to the
1 The author would like to thank Sham Qayyum and Anna Kallioinen for their generous help in
reviewing this article.
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determining factor of Islamic financial institutions: the role of Sharia compli-
ance. Finally, a review of English courts’ adjudication of Islamic financial trans-
actions is provided, elucidating the courts’ unwillingness to apply the Sharia in
cases in which Sharia compliance is in question.
ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE UK
The flow of Middle Eastern capital to the City of London has been accompanied
by the rise of Islamic finance, an alternative form of financing that purports to
structure its contracts and financial services according to Islam’s holy law, the
Sharia. The Sharia forbids the taking of interest and speculative transactions
such as derivatives, and seeks to create value through real, tangible assets.
Moreover, companies involved in the sale of pork, alcohol, pornography, gam-
bling, some forms of entertainment, and corporations with large interest-
generating investments are forbidden to Islamic investment. Islamic financial
products are engineered by melding together a series of age-old classical
Islamic contracts so as to comply with the conventional regulatory system and
to compete in highly competitive global financial markets. While the products
and services offer Muslim investors similar economic returns to conventional
products, their underlying legal structures and corresponding risks are
markedly different.
The UK government has skilfully pursued the creation of an Islamic sub-
economy, which it prefers to call ‘alternative financial investments’, by enacting
legislative and regulatory measures designed to facilitate Islamic financial trans-
actions. A concerted and wide-ranging governmental effort is underway by a
number of authorities who have established working groups to advise the govern-
ment on Islamic finance. Her Majesty’s Treasury has established the HM
Treasury Islamic Experts Group, and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
formed the HM Revenue and Customs Islamic Finance Group. Furthermore,
the UK Trade and Investment agency is actively promoting Islamic financial ser-
vices and, in particular, the City of London’s leading position in the growing field.2
Legislative measures have largely focused on amending tax provisions for
Islamic financial structures in that these contracts acquire and dispose of tangi-
ble assets, commonly in sale and repurchase schemes that transfer title in prop-
erty multiple times. Hence, the first legislative measure was to amend stamp
duty land tax so as to facilitate Islamic finance’s most utilised structure, themur-
abaha – a sale plus mark-up scheme – that hitherto was disadvantaged on
account of its tax treatment. On the regulatory front, the government has
2 ‘Country Focus: United Kingdom – Open Door Policy’ (2007) 164 (April–June)NewHorizon: Global
perspectives on Islamic banking and insurance 24–28. ,http://www.islamic-banking.com/resources/
7/NewHorizon%20Previouse%20Issues/NewHorizon_AprJun07.pdf., accessed 1 October 2010.
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found it appropriate to enact very few regulatory provisions that address the
unique contractual features of Islamic finance. The FSA,3 the universal regulator
of all financial services in the UK, applies a conventional risk-based approach to
the industry, which stresses economic substance over legal form. However, the
religious and cultural aspects of Islamic finance constitute the primary reasons
for Muslims’ uptake of these products. Thus, a uniform regulatory treatment
may overlook or obviate some of the unique characteristics associated with
the industry.
Britain now houses five domestic Islamic financial institutions which claim to
offer Sharia-compliant financial products and services and the City of London
has established itself as the third largest market for Islamic finance after the
Gulf Co-operation Council states and Malaysia. Yet the history of Islamic
banking in the United Kingdom is fairly recent.4 HSBC launched its amanah
current account and home financing products in 2003 and Lloyds TSB
also introduced a range of Islamic retail banking products. Not until 2004
did the FSA license the Islamic Bank of Britain, which purports to be the
first wholly Sharia-compliant retail bank in the United Kingdom.5 Since then
four other Islamic financial institutions have been authorised, including the
European Islamic Investment Bank and, most recently, Gatehouse Bank, a
wholesale Islamic financial institution. Moreover, at least nine Islamic fund
managers, one Sharia-compliant hedge fund manager, a takaful insurance pro-
vider6 and a growing number of advisory firms in the legal, accountancy and
consultancy professions are active in the UK.7
THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIVES
The UK government offers two reasons for its regulatory strategy: First, it hopes
to establish an Islamic financial centre in the City of London and thus maintain
3 The newly-elected Conservative government has announced that the FSA will be disbanded. In its
place a new Prudential Regulatory Authority within the Bank of England will oversee prudential
regulatory concerns while a separate Consumer Protection and Markets Authority will focus on
the protection of consumers. The new regulatory system will come online in 2012.
4 R Wilson, ‘Islamic banking in the United Kingdom’ in M Fahim Khan and M Porzio (eds), Islamic
Banking and Finance in the European Union (Cheltenham, 2010), p 212. In the early 1980s a number
of Middle Eastern Islamic banks established subsidiaries in the UK, which conducted wholesale
operations. Banks such as Saudi International Bank and the United Bank of Kuwait accepted depos-
its on a murabaha cost-plus basis and conducted short-term trades on the London Metal Exchange.
5 NS&I, Sharia Compliant Savings Review (2008), pp 1–22. ,http://www.nsandi.com/files/asset/pdf/
sharia’a_savings_review.pdf., accessed 1 October 2010.
6 Conventional insurance is widely prohibited according to Islamic law as it entails a strong element of
speculation and/or excessive risk known as gharar. Takaful insurance offers Muslims a form of com-
munal insurance whereby premiums are pooled in investment projects and disbursed as gifts or
donations to compensate a member’s claim.
7 HM Treasury, The Development of Islamic Finance in the UK: the Government’s perspective (London,
2008), pp 1–30.
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London’s status as Europe’s premier financial centre, and indeed, one of the
leading financial centres in the world.8 Specifically, the development of a thriv-
ing and competitive market in Islamic financial products could substantially
benefit the United Kingdom by generating further investment, jobs and indirect
tax revenues in the economy.9 Secondly, the government seeks to include a large
domestic Muslim minority in the financial marketplace. While eight out of ten
of most minority groups in the United Kingdom have accounts with financial
institutions – compared with nine out of ten of the majority population –
only two-thirds of those of Pakistani origin and just over half of those of
Bangladeshi origin do.10 Research attributes these statistics to Muslims’
beliefs in abstaining from interest-based financial transactions although many
British Muslim respondents often argue that interest-based activities are
permissible with respect to loans and non-essential consumption.11
The state’s policy of facilitating the Islamic financial industry may also help to
incorporate unregulated Islamic financial activities whose market participants
are otherwise deprived of regulatory and consumer protections12 and whose
financial activities undermine the state’s fiscal and monetary policies. Indeed,
some minority groups have traditionally sought financial advice, borrowing
and lending within the community on the basis of recommendations and
kinship networks. In effect, informal credit unions have been established in
many areas housing large minority populations.13 Moreover, research concern-
ing hawala money transfer systems highlights a complex web of global traders
whose ability to transfer money to the far reaches of the globe undercuts the
nation-state’s ability to keep tabs on its citizens’ monetary activities.14
Informal Islamic commercial transactions reflect the limits of state law as it
may be weakened by the allegiance of subjects to competing legal norms and
value systems.15 In co-opting Islamic financial practices Muslim minorities
may feel that they should and can behave in a way that conforms to the
8 City of London, Global Financial Centres 7 (London, 2010). ,http://www.zyen.com/PDF/GFC%207.
pdf., accessed 1 October 2010.
9 HMRC, Impact Assessment for Stamp Duty Land Tax, Capital Gains & Capital Allowance Tax Reliefs for
Alternative Finance Investment Bonds (London, 2009). ,http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2009/
afi-bonds-100.pdf., accessed 1 October 2010.
10 P Meadows, Access to Financial Services (London, 2000), pp 1–34.
11 Ibid p 17. Other, less often cited reasons for doing so relate to the classical differentiation between dar
al harb (abode of war) and dar al Islam (abode of peace). Some classical jurists argued that interest
could be accepted from infidels in the dar al harb, ie non-Muslim territories.
12 HMRC, Impact Assessment, p 5.
13 Meadows, Access to Financial Services, p 17.
14 R Ballard, ‘Coalitions of reciprocity and the maintenance of financial integrity within informal value
transmission systems: the operational dynamics of contemporary hawala networks’, (2005) 6 Journal
of Banking Regulation 319. See also R Ballard, ‘The operation of contemporary informal value transfer
(hawala) systems’, (unpublished, 2007).
15 A Allot, The Limits of Law (London, 1980), p 148. See also W Menski, Comparative Law in a Global
Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge, 2006).
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requirements of state law. Clearly, the government stands a greater likelihood of
compelling compliance amongst minority Muslim populations by legalising
previously informal transactions and bringing these into the regulatory light.
THE MODUS OPERANDI OF REGULATING ALTERNATIVE FINANCE
The government characterises its uniform regulatory approach to the develop-
ment of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom as fair and consistent, rooted
in the belief that no financial system deserves special treatment to the detriment
of others. It states unequivocally that ‘all financial institutions authorised by the
FSA and operating in the UK, or seeking to do so, are subject to the same stan-
dards. This is true regardless of their country of origin, the sectors in which they
wish to specialise, or their religious principles . . .’16 In essence, the government
espouses a religiously ‘neutral’ position predicated on the establishment of a
‘level playing field’ for Islamic finance that is not distorted by tax and regulatory
laws originally conceived for the conventional, interest-based system.17 As a
result, since 2003 all legislative amendments to Acts of parliament including
both finance and regulatory provisions refer to ‘alternative financial instru-
ments’ when referring to general Islamic financial products and ‘alternative
investment bonds’ when referring to Islamic bonds known as sukuk. Thus the
religiously descriptive ‘Islamic investments’ is replaced with the ideologically
neutral ‘alternative financial instruments’. These usages are in line with a uni-
versalistic and uniform approach to the law, which emphasises the equal
dignity of citizens and refrains from taking legislative positions on particular
religious, cultural or value-embedded norms of minority populations. The
FSA states that ‘it would not be appropriate, even if it were possible, for
the FSA to judge between different interpretations of Sharia law.’18 Hence the
FSA believes that neutrality can be achieved by avoiding any subjectivity or
‘bias’ and by focusing on concrete data (usually quantitative in nature) which
can be understood in absolute terms and free of context. Moreover, a neutral
position can be claimed between and vis-a`-vis faith-based arguments.19
The utilisation of neutral language reflects the government’s unease in trans-
gressing the social consensus regarding the particular role of religion in the
United Kingdom. This angst is expressed in government documents reaffirm-
ing the government’s desire to create a ‘level playing field’, its repeated tender-
ing of denials that it is granting ‘special favours’ and so forth. Therefore, the
16 M Ainley, A Mashayekhi, R Hicks, A Rahman and A Ravaliaet, Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation
and Challenges (London, 2007), p 11.
17 HM Treasury, The Development of Islamic Finance, p 13.
18 Ainley et al, Islamic Finance, p 13.
19 M Malik, ‘Faith and the state of jurisprudence’ in P Oliver (ed), Faith in Law: Essays in Legal Theory
(Portland, 2000), pp 138–139.
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government takes no responsibility for problems of choice of evaluative criteria
such as whether an Islamic financial product or service complies with the
Sharia, just as it would not take a position on whether Christian investments
were compatible with canon law. The state affirms that this would be
‘inappropriate’ as a ‘secular’ regulator.20
THE RISK OF SHARIA NON-COMPLIANCE
Individual financial institutions are wholly responsible for determining whether
the products and services they offer comply with the principles and tenets of the
Sharia. In accordance with the standard set by Accounting and Auditing
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, most Islamic financial insti-
tutions opt to form a Sharia supervisory board comprising three Sharia scholars
trained in the classical Islamic laws of commerce, although others have chosen
to use Sharia consultancy services or have merely hired a single Sharia advisor.
The state takes no position on the composition, process, or credibility of such
boards other than enforcing its rules regarding ‘Approved Persons’, which we
examine below.
The FSA has expressed concern regarding the unique role of Sharia supervi-
sory boards in Islamic financial institutions insofar as these entities are respon-
sible for approving and legitimating the ‘Islamic’ products and services that
originate from such institutions. Yet the state is essentially hamstrung from
developing criteria and procedures to address the qualitative nature of the
boards other than those employed to examine the corporate governance of con-
ventional financial institutions. The FSA’s focus centres on the role of the Sharia
boards in each authorised firm, particularly its impact on the direction or oper-
ation of the firm. In particular, the FSAmust determine whether Sharia scholars
are assigned an executive role or whether they merely provide advisory services
to the institution. According to the FSA Approved Persons rules, the suitability
of anyone acting as a director is assessed according to ‘fit and proper’ criteria.
For example, a criterion relates to the competence and capability of the candidate
so that a prospective director would be expected to have relevant experience and
education. In the case that a Sharia scholar’s role does resemble that of an execu-
tive director, multiple memberships of different financial institutions’ Sharia
boards would be problematic due to significant conflicts of interest.
Internationally, the practice of Sharia scholars sitting on multiple supervisory
boards is a common, if not regular, occurrence. However, the FSA claims that
FSA-authorised Islamic financial institutions to date have shown that Sharia
scholars occupy advisory roles only so that their responsibilities do not interfere
20 HM Treasury, The Development of Islamic Finance, p 19.
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in the management of the firm. In evaluating the role of Sharia boards the FSA
directs particular attention to the governance structure, fee structure, reporting
lines as well as the terms and conditions of Sharia scholars’ contracts.21
Furthermore, the state does not interfere in the affairs of Sharia boards after
it has determined that Sharia board roles do not conflict in the management
of the organisation.
Despite the state’s inability to directly address Sharia-related aspects of the
Sharia supervisory process, the FSA acknowledges that the unique role of
Sharia scholars has potential implications for the solvency of Islamic financial
institutions. In particular, the market’s response to a breach of Sharia rules
could dispel confidence in Islamic financial institutions as such assets would
automatically be seen as liabilities and banks’ solvency could be thrown into
question.22 Yet the FSA’s approach to regulating Islamic financial institutions
largely ignores this central reputational risk.
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BEFORE ENGLISH COURTS
The competence and integrity of the Sharia supervisory process has been called
into question in recent disputes before commercial courts. An English court
recently heard an appeal between an Islamic financial institution, Kuwait’s
The Investment Dar, and the defendant, Lebanon’s Blom Bank.23 The
Investment Dar argued that it should not have to pay the Blom Bank a fixed
return on deposits invested with it insofar as its articles of association prevent
it from engaging in forbidden (haram) activities, ie interest (riba)-based activi-
ties. Ironically, The Investment Dar’s Sharia board had approved the transaction
and attempted to persuade an English judge that it did not do its job properly.24
Moreover, an earlier dispute involving an Islamic financial structure25 which
represents the first purportedly ‘Islamic’ financial transaction tried in a
Western court – illustrated a transaction that resembled a loan dressed up in
Islamic garb. It too had been approved by the Islamic Investment Company’s
Sharia board and originally agreed by all parties to the dispute. Nonetheless,
the defendants subsequently argued that the contract’s contravention of the
Sharia rendered the contract null and void.26 The court refused to try the case
21 Ainley et al, Islamic Finance, p 14.
22 Ibid, pp 18–19.
23 The Investment Dar v Blom Developments Bank [2009] EWHC 3545 (Ch).
24 A Cunningham, ‘Role of Sharia boards needs modernisation’, (2010) Financial Times 21 April.
25 Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems N. & Others [2002] All ER (D)
171 (Feb).
26 For example see JCT Chuah, ‘Islamic principles governing international trade financing instru-
ments: a study of the morabaha in English law’, (2006–2007) 27 Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business 137–170 and HA Hamoudi, ‘Jurisprudential schizophrenia: on
form and function in Islamic finance’, (2006–2007) 7 Chicago Journal of International Law 605–
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according to the Sharia as the contract expressly designated English law as the
governing law of the contract.
SHARIA’S ROLE AS A NON-STATE LAW
Islamic finance has developed through cross-border commercial practice in the
‘shadow of the law’27 insofar as the Sharia officially operates as the sovereign law
of just one country; Saudi Arabia declares this officially. Other countries
throughout the Middle East combine common or civil legal codes with
Islamic law. The transnational origins of the field were recently highlighted in
two authoritative cases before English courts: Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd v
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC andHalpern and Others v Halpern and Another estab-
lish clear precedents concerning the non-feasibility of the choice of a non-state
law as the proper law of a contract. The courts held in both cases that the Rome
Convention, an EU treaty whose provisions, in general, established the law gov-
erning contractual relations in the UK at the time these cases were heard, 28 does
not provide parties with a choice of a non-state body of law as the governing law
of the contract.29 A subsidiary reflection of the court in Beximco held that the
Sharia was not determinate enough to effectively govern commercial and finan-
cial transactions, a position that reflects English court judgments since the early
decisions of Sheikh Abu Dhabi v Petroleum Ltd., 30 Ruler of Qatar v International
Marine Oil Company Ltd.31 and the famous 1958 Aramco v Government of Saudi
Arabia32 award. In each of these rulings, British magistrates held that the
Sharia could not ‘reasonably be said to exist’, or it ‘contains no precise rule’ con-
cerning a particular contract, so that Islamic law could not ‘reasonably’ be used
as the governing law.33 Muslim critics of these decisions argue that many legal
systems entail similar difficulties and highlight the role that the Sharia plays in
Middle Eastern litigation, and, especially in arbitration.34 Further, the Sharia’s
fundamental legal importance is evidenced in its inclusion in state constitutions
as ‘a source’ or ‘the source’ throughout the Middle East. Consequently, it has
662. Both articles are highly critical of Islamic finance and accuse the industry of pursuing form over
substance to the detriment of Islamic principles and ethics.
27 K Baelz, ‘A murabaha transaction in an English court’, (2004) 11 Islamic Law and Society 117. Baelz
presents a very thorough and insightful analysis of the case.
28 The Rome Convention has since been superseded by the Rome I Regulation. However, Rome I also
does not see any role for a non-state body of law as the governing law of a contract.
29 In particular, see Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Shamil Bank of Bahrain [2004] EWCA Civ 19. And
the most recent related case: Halpern and Others v Halpern and Another [2007] EWCA Civ 291.
30 Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi [1951] 18 ILR 144.
31 Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil Company Ltd [1953] 20 Int LR 534.
32 Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co (Aramco) [1958] 27 Int LR 117.
33 I Fadlallah, ‘Arbitration facing conflicts of culture: the 2008 Annual School of International
Arbitration Lecture’, (2009) 25 Arbitration International 305–306. Fadlallah presents a very interest-
ing discussion of the general argument.
34 Ibid.
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influenced countries’ legal systems to varying degrees35 and, at any rate,
occupies a very sacred position in the hearts and minds of Muslims throughout
the world, whether they are devout or secular.
CONCLUSION
The state’s authorisation of Islamic financial institutions could potentially facili-
tate the inclusion of large numbers of Britain’s Muslim population in financial
services markets that have heretofore avoided the conventional banking sector
on the basis of their religious beliefs. Therefore, the Sharia-compliance of
such institutions is at the heart of their decision to invest in Islamic financial
products, and, as a result, creates a unique reputational risk associated with
the industry. Yet the FSA, in its remit to create a level playing field amongst
all financial services markets, is prevented from taking steps to advance the
financial interests of one market over another; nor may it entertain religious
interests in the secular practice of its regulatory responsibilities. Hence, the
FSA is only indirectly able to address the risk of Sharia non-compliance
through its Approved Persons rules. Furthermore, English courts have been
unwilling to apply the Sharia in commercial disputes on the basis that the
Rome Convention – now Rome I – precludes parties’ choice of a non-state
body of law as the governing law of their contract. Therefore, the risk of
Sharia non-compliance continues unabated; a fact the state seems content to
ignore.
The regulatory and legal treatment of Islamic finance in the UK throws light
on the institutional basis – the values, norms and social purpose – of our gov-
ernance structure. It also reveals a picture of society that is unwilling or unable –
on the basis of our created institutions – to tolerate a truly alternative system of
finance. Therefore, the state is intent on garnering the economic and social
benefits of Islamic finance, but it has no intention of making concessions that
would prejudice the current regime.
doi:10.1017/S0956618X10000827
35 W Ballantyne, ‘The Shari’a and its relevance to modern transnational transactions’ in Arab
Comparative & Commercial Law (London, 1987). Also, W Ballantyne, ‘Commercial law: the conflict
in shari’a and secular law’ in S Behdad and F Nomani (eds), International Review of Comparative
Public Policy (London, 1997).
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